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Economic Challenges for the Law of Contract 
Alan Schwartz† & Simone M. Sepe†† 
This Essay introduces general equilibrium theory (GET) and mech-
anism design theory (MD) in a general sense (rather than in piece meal 
applications) to the study of contract law. As a positive matter, this intro-
duction reveals three understudied areas: (i) when the equilibrium con-
tract is individually rational but collectively irrational; (ii) the role of 
courts in market completion projects; and (iii) the implementation of re-
negotiation-proof mechanisms. As a normative matter, incorporating 
GET and MD insights into the study of contract law supports broad free-
dom of contract and formalist interpretative practices. Lastly, this Essay 
points to several areas for future research, highlighting the central role of 
law and economics analysis in identifying feasible mechanism design pro-
grams for contract law. 
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Contract law—the body of rules that regulates contracts generally—
serves three core functions.1 First, the law specifies the necessary condi-
tions that private agents must satisfy to make their promises legally en-
forceable and selects the subset of those promises actually to enforce. 
Second, contract law supplies private agents with default terms. Third, 
the law supplies rules that facilitate transactions such as the rules regulat-
ing offer and acceptance and contract interpretation.  
Law and economics (L&E) uses contract theory to study these func-
tions. Contract theory is the economic field that studies how agents de-
sign transactions in the presence of asymmetric information.2 In this Es-
say, we ask how scholars and courts can increase the theoretical and 
institutional sophistication of L&E contracting analyses. To do this, we 
situate contract law in the two foundational economic fields from which 
contract theory sprung—the general equilibrium theory of incomplete 
markets (GET) and the theory of mechanism design (MD).  
GET identifies the efficient set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu 
(A-D) contracts (i.e., the “A-D equilibrium contract set”). As is well 
known, however, this full set requires the satisfaction of unrealistic eco-
nomic assumptions (i.e., complete markets) in order to exist.3  When GET 
analysis incorporates real-world frictions (i.e., incomplete markets), it 
then teaches that the A-D equilibrium contract set might (i) not exist, (ii) 
not be unique, and (iii) in any event, might be inefficient.4 These results 
imply that state intervention—“planning” in the GET jargon—often is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert. E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the 
Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524-25 (2016).  
 2. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Owner-
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver D. Hart 
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990); Bengt 
Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979); Bengt Holmström, 
Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982).   
 3. For a discussion of these assumptions tailored to a legal audience, see William W. 
Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control, 105 
CORNELL L. REV. 675, 701-705 (2020). 
 4. See John Geanakoplos & Herakles Polemarchakis, Existence, Regularity, and Con-
strained Suboptimality of Competitive Allocations When Markets Are Incomplete, in 3 ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF KENNETH ARROW 77 (Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr & David A. Starrett eds., 
1986). Pollution illustrates an incomplete market. A firm may emit pollution because there is no 
market for emissions that prices them and charges the firm for its output. A cap-and-trade re-
gime attempts to create such a market. 
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necessary to realize efficiency. We therefore ask here how contract law 
can play a planning role. 
This approach departs from the standard L&E approach to contract 
failure, which assumes that every efficient contract law rule moves the set 
of feasible contracts closer to the A-D equilibrium set.5 L&E scholarship 
thus views contract law as an institution that promotes efficiency against 
the benchmark of an efficient market equilibrium. On the contrary, under 
GET with incomplete markets, contract law must be a planning device 
designed to remedy market incompleteness by substituting in various 
ways for an inefficient (or a non-existent) equilibrium.   
Three elements constitute this planning role of contract law: 
i. decentralized implementation: resource allocation decisions 
are delegated to contracting parties;6 
ii. state supplied mandatory, default and facilitative rules; and 
iii. a state supplied adjudication system.7 
Viewing contract law as planning has four important implications for 
its three core elements. First, GET analysis shows that mandatory and de-
fault rules embody different planning strategies. Efficient mandatory 
rules correct private allocations by not enforcing promises that would 
create negative externalities. Efficient default rules complete markets by 
reproducing the contracts that parties would have made in a world with-
out frictions. Despite their mandatory phrasing, standards also attempt to 
complete markets, but raise two concerns. First, they can be insufficiently 
directive—behave “reasonably”—and so perform the market completion 
function poorly. Second, it is less costly to create standards than rules—
again, behave “reasonably”—which creates an incentive for the state to 
overproduce standards relative to default rules. 
Second, GET analysis uncovers two largely unexplored issues in con-
tract scholarship. The first is how the state should respond when the equi-
librium market contract is individually rational but collectively irrational: 
that is, in GET terms, when parties make and enforce contracts without 
considering the general equilibrium effects (i.e., the pecuniary externali-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 5. This assumption is accompanied by a complementary one: that the constraints arising 
in incomplete markets are separable so that implementing a rule in order to satisfy one con-
straint will not affect how other rules function. 
 6. This Essay only focuses on the law of contracts as it applies to commercial parties for 
the reasons identified in, for example, Alan Schwartz & Robert. E. Scott, Contract Theory and 
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). This Essay also excludes from the analysis 
self-enforcing agreements between sophisticated parties where reputational mechanisms suffice 
to solve most contracting problems. See, e.g., George Baker et al., Relational Contracts and the 
Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. ECON. 39, 39 (2002); Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Con-
tracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 835 (2003). 
 7. These elements act simultaneously (rather than disjointly) to ground planning by 
contract law, meaning that they are both essential to the remedial strategy against market in-
completeness. Put differently, freedom of contract without a system of rules and adjudication 
would not provide a remedy against market incompleteness, and vice versa. 
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ties) their choices impose on others.8 A classic example occurs when, in 
bad economies, many creditors foreclose simultaneously, thereby creating 
“fire sales”: low asset prices in consequence of a rapid shift out of the 
supply curve just when the demand curve is collapsing.9 Such phenomena 
raise open substantive and institutional questions. Substantively, what 
would a general solution to the problem of collectively irrational con-
tracts look like? Institutionally, which legal institution would be best at 
identifying, quantifying and internalizing pecuniary externalities?  
Third, GET shows that the conditions for effective market comple-
tion are stringent.10 The common law adjudication mechanism, consistent 
with GET analysis, has produced a few “transcontextual” rules (i.e., rules 
that solve contracting problems in various transactional environments 
and so do not condition on particular parties’ private information). The 
United States has attempted broader market completion projects, such as 
the efforts of the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commis-
sion. Against GET’s warning lesson, these projects rely heavily on stand-
ards,11 which are almost costless to create. To this extent, GET analysis 
supports the prior work of one of us, which argues that the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s turn to 
standards is misguided.12  
Finally, characterizing contract law as a planning institution to com-
plete markets has implications for the enforcement and interpretation of 
contracts themselves. To examine these, mechanism design theory—the 
study of how parties can implement optimal contracting plans—is helpful. 
MD theory has devised optimal theoretical mechanisms to solve asym-
metric information problems affecting contractual relationships: the too 
little trade problem;13 the adverse selection problem;14 and the moral haz-
ard problem.15 Economists have been largely indifferent to the practical 
implementation problems that attend these mechanisms, however. This 
suggests a complementary function for law and economics scholars. In-
deed, these scholars are uniquely positioned to bridge the communication 
gap between economists and lawyers, and so to pursue the practical 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 8. See Guido Lorenzoni, Inefficient Credit Booms, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 809 (2008). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). 
 11. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 1570-77. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilat-
eral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983). An applied analysis of this problem is in Daniel 
Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Right, Remedies and Interpretation: A Theory of Private Law 
(2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 14. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 15. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 2; Hart & Moore, supra note 2; Holmström, 
Moral Hazard and Observability, supra note 2; Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, supra note 
2. 
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strengths and constraints that attend the economic theory. Law and eco-
nomics analyses thus should import mechanism design models into the 
study of contract law. 
Some scholars object that while MD mechanisms theoretically lead 
to first best outcomes, the mechanisms are not observed in practice: they 
are too abstract and too complex, and assign roles to courts that courts 
cannot play. These objections are misconceived. To be sure, mechanism 
design protocols sometimes use tools that contract law prohibits, such as 
the reliance on penalties to encourage the revelation of private infor-
mation. More deeply, though, the objections misconceive what a mecha-
nism is. Private agents create mechanisms to structure the particular in-
formation revelation games that efficiency requires them to play. For 
example, sellers create auction rules that induce prospective buyers to bid 
their actual valuations. Recent work by Lisa Bernstein analyzing modern 
procurement contracts,16 and by Ronald Gilson and his coauthors analyz-
ing platforms to develop new products,17 show that private agents create 
structures that induce each of them to reveal information to their coun-
terparties that is necessary for efficient contracting. Though the mecha-
nisms that the creators of MD theory put forth as proofs of concept are 
not seen, the basic idea is instantiated in practice: real world agents create 
mechanisms to overcome asymmetric information obstacles to efficient 
contracting.18 
Integrating MD into law and economics contracting analysis is an 
ambitious project, which we only introduce here. We use three contract 
law areas to illustrate practical implementation problems: renegotiation, 
enforcement and interpretation. Three conclusions emerge. First, con-
tract law rules sometimes prohibit the renegotiation-proof schemes that 
the economic literature has identified as helping to solve the problem of 
inducing agents to make relation-specific investments. In particular, the 
law of contract modification restricts the parties’ ability to create efficient 
commitment devices by enforcing only oral no-modification clauses and, 
more generally, by creating rules that facilitate renegotiation.19 The ques-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 16. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1781-82 (1996) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
 17. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interac-
tion of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1377 (2010). 
 18. We thank Lisa Bernstein for providing this insight. For an earlier effort at import-
ing MD models into L&E contracting analysis and showing that these models are feasible in the 
real world, see Anup Malani & Richard T. Holden, Renegotiation Design by Contract, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 151 (2014).   
 19. See infra Section II.C.1. 
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tion of how parties can ban renegotiations that have the effect of undoing 
ex ante efficient investment schemes is underexplored in the literature.20 
Second, and relatedly, MD and GET theories coalesce on the desir-
ability of a broad delegation to parties to create allocations: that is, on a 
broad role for freedom of contract. The theories also support a formalist 
approach to contract interpretation and enforcement. Expanding free-
dom of contract would help agents overcome (or avoid) constraints to the 
implementation of an optimal mechanism design program for contract 
law. Formalism in interpretation also helps to mitigate those constraints. 
The combination of freedom of contract and formalism reduces the like-
lihood that “court renegotiation”—the ex post modification of contracts 
by courts—will undo contractual incentives that parties create to encour-
age investment. This MD argument for formalism is independent of 
whether a contextualist court is more likely than a formalist court to re-
cover the true meaning of a contract’s words. 
Finally, incorporating mechanism design theory into L&E contract-
ing analyses introduces another unexplored question: what can symmetri-
cally informed parties communicate to courts? Economists suggest having 
courts police the truthfulness of interparty communications, but this re-
flects an uninformed view of the judicial function. On the other hand, 
truthfully informing courts of payoff-relevant parameters of bargains can 
be a necessary aspect of efficient judicial regulation. Optimal communica-
tion between parties and courts is understudied. Arbitrators and special-
ized courts are a possible solution to the communication problem. Spe-
cialized courts would help reduce the trial costs of communication, 
expanding the set of efficient contracts parties can write. The existence of 
a specialized court, however, raises the question of when parties would 
prefer it to a generalist court.21 Further investigation of these as well as 
several other questions raised by this Essay are fruitful areas for future 
research. 
I. Markets and Contract Law 
A. Contracts in Complete vs. Incomplete Markets 
Much L&E research studies the constraints that bound the set of 
feasible contracts away from the set of fully contingent A-D contracts.22 
Restated, this analysis supposes that the market equilibrium is the 
benchmark for efficient contracts. But what characterizes contracts in the 
A-D equilibrium set?  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 20. An early effort along these lines is Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and 
Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2 (2004). 
 21. This question is explored in Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Con-
tract Interpretation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2015). 
 22. Patrick Bolton, Renegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design, 34 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 303, 303 (1990) (referring generally to economic research). 
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These contracts are bilateral transactions (i.e., trades) pursuant to 
which a commodity (that can be defined abstractedly to include a prom-
ise) is exchanged against a price. If the contract is complex, (i) it will in-
volve more than one trade, (ii) each trade will entail the exchange of a 
different commodity, and (iii) the contract’s price will be the sum of the 
prices of all the contract’s constituent trades. For example, consider a 
seller trading commodity x against price 𝑝", where the seller also guaran-
tees the quality of x with warranty y against price 𝑝#. This contract is de-
composable into (i) the trade of commodity x; and (ii) the trade of war-
ranty y, where y can be represented either as an Arrow-Debreu security 
contingent on some description of x (e.g., the present or future quality of 
x) or as a buy-back contract on x (still contingent on the present or future 
quality of x). More generally, in complete markets, any right (and obliga-
tion) can be described as a tradable commodity, that is, an Arrow-Debreu 
security.23 In this transactional environment, the state’s role should be re-
stricted to the protection of property and the enforcement of contracts. 
Everything else is dealt with by the price system, which induces agents to 
move to the A-D equilibrium contract set.  
In the real world of incomplete markets, however, the price system 
no longer coordinates economic actors to produce optimal allocations. 
GET shows that when markets are incomplete, competitive allocations 
are neither Pareto nor constrained-Pareto optimal.24 That is, even if one 
defines the optimality of allocations relative to the limited contract set 
that is feasible in incomplete markets (i.e., taking into account the limited 
ability of agents to redistribute income across future states through trad-
able securities),25 all competitive equilibria are (constrained-Pareto) 
suboptimal. The consequentialist prescription is that state intervention 
(“planning”) is desirable to produce more efficient allocations.  
This prescription expands the role of contract law beyond a minimal 
system of rules that enable price coordination. The L&E scholarship that 
uses market equilibria as benchmarks thus is misconceived. Rather, GET 
holds that the role of contract law as an institution—a planning device in 
GET terms—is to promote efficiency not against the benchmark of an ef-
ficient market equilibrium, but rather as a substitute for an inefficient (or 
non-existent) market equilibrium. 
Planning by contract law, however, does not mean central planning 
where the planner (i.e., the state) determines allocations. Rather, free-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 23. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 704 (1995). 
 24. Constrained Pareto efficiency is the less demanding criterion that defines the opti-
mality of markets relative to the limited ability of agents to redistribute income across future 
contingencies. See John Geanakoplos, An Introduction to General Equilibrium with Incomplete 
Asset Markets, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 1, 7 (1990).  
 25. See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure 
Is Incomplete, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 418, 419 (1975).  
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dom of contract is foundational to the common law of contract, and so 
must be incorporated into any planning scheme.  
With this as given, GET supports two basic planning strategies to 
improve efficiency in incomplete markets. Initially, the planner (here, the 
state or a court) should attempt to complete markets. Completing mar-
kets produces a Pareto improvement by making possible allocations that 
could not otherwise occur because the reference market does not exist 
(or is too costly for private actors to create) but that would take place if 
markets were complete. Completing existing markets, however, requires 
the planner to have private information about agents that often is inac-
cessible. Therefore, GET planning might be limited to the second strate-
gy of “correcting allocations.” This strategy holds that when market com-
pletion is not feasible, contract law should abandon the effort to make 
Pareto improvements in favor of promoting Pareto-constrained efficient 
allocations that take market incompleteness as given. The practical impli-
cation of this view is that contract law should prevent inefficient alloca-
tions that would take place at the equilibrium in incomplete markets. 
B. Planning by Contract Law 
The GET planning strategy therefore has two parts. The first, as just 
said, is to prevent inefficient allocations, which is generally done through 
mandatory rules. The second is to supply default rules that become im-
plied terms in private contracts and so help to complete markets. We 
begin with prevention through mandatory rules. 
1. Mandatory Rules 
Mandatory rules either require contracts to contain a term or pro-
hibit contracts from including a term. In the conventional account, the 
state prohibits terms either because a term would have been a step in cre-
ating an externality (to fix prices) or because the decision maker believes 
that the prohibited term could not be in any contracting agent’s best in-
terest. The second rationale is inapplicable when commercial parties 
would use the term26 but otherwise raises consumer protection issues that 
are beyond our scope. 
In a GET framework, efficient mandatory rules thus are a part of a 
planning strategy that corrects inefficient allocations. To this extent, GET 
recharacterization of mandatory rules helps illustrate a largely unex-
plored area of contract scholarship—one with macroeconomic implica-
tions: when the equilibrium contract is collectively irrational. This, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 26. See Aaron Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contract, 78 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 33 (2004); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. 
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economic theory, is referred to as a “pecuniary externality.”27 If agents 
acted cooperatively (a condition which contradicts competitive markets), 
they could reduce the negative effect of this externality. But coordination 
difficulties often prevent cooperation, and then agents make the collec-
tively bad contracts because each agent expects to lose upon the occur-
rence of a “bad” state less than what the economy as whole would lose. 
An example illustrates the problem. Suppose that parties were free 
to choose, in their lending agreements, whether to have an insolvency re-
solved under Chapter 7 (liquidation) or Chapter 11 (reorganization), or 
not to treat the issue contractually. Contractually unconstrained insolvent 
firms would choose reorganization too often because the equity’s call op-
tion—to purchase the firm by repaying the debt—is increasing in the time 
to exercise and the managers get private benefits from delay. When par-
ties anticipate that these factors would produce a costly reorganization, 
reorganization would not be the ex ante equilibrium contract. If every 
borrowing pair would contract to require the insolvent debtor to choose 
reorganization, a particular pair would defect to a less costly contract that 
would require liquidation. The parties would save on reorganization costs 
and the creditor would be the only seller and so could realize a high price 
for the debtor’s assets. The creditor’s high insolvency payoff would yield 
better lending terms for the borrower ex ante.  
On the other hand, if every borrowing pair chose the liquidation 
contract, high reorganization and delay costs could deter a particular bor-
rowing pair from defecting to the reorganization contract. Hence, over 
plausible parameter values the credit market equilibrium contract would 
have every party choose the liquidation contract. When distress is posi-
tively correlated across firms, the result would be fire sale prices that will 
reduce welfare for everyone.28 
In this example, the equilibrium contract—the liquidation contract—
is individually rational but collectively irrational. Indeed, the first best 
contract would have parties deferring the choice of bankruptcy chapter 
until insolvency occurs: for then parties could renegotiate to the ex-post 
efficient chapter.29  
The question of whether there is a general solution to the problem of 
collectively irrational contracts remains open. Should the authority to re-
strict the parties’ contracting space belong exclusively to the state? Or are 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 27. See Lorenzoni, supra note 8, at 809. In GET, any externality is a pecuniary exter-
nality (or a degenerate case of a pecuniary externality). 
 28. See Antonio E. Bernardo, Alan Schwartz & Ivo Welch, Contracting Externalities 
and Mandatory Menus in the US Corporate Bankruptcy Code, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 395 (2016).  
 29. A second important example is the “search externality.” When shopping is costly 
for consumers, the individually rational price for a firm to charge is higher than the competitive 
price. But when all firms price super-competitively, consumers search even less to the disad-
vantage of all. Again, the cause is that each firm does not consider the effect of its contracting 
choice on other firms. 
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there cases, such as in the example above, where courts should be em-
powered to not enforce collectively irrational contracts? 
2. Default Rules 
Many scholars believe that the principal function of contract law is 
to supply private agents with implied terms—default rules—that com-
plete the private agents’ contracts. The common justification for this view 
is that default rules increase social welfare because they do for parties 
what they would have done for themselves had their contracting costs 
been lower. Reframed in GET terms, the default-rule creation mecha-
nism is a market completion strategy under which trades that parties have 
not explicitly chosen are added to the market contract.  
GET results on market-completion strategies are not encouraging, 
however. Completing a market requires information that the planner 
might not have or be unable to access. The theory of second-best is even 
more skeptical. It predicts that when adding a market does not fully com-
plete markets, a market-completion strategy might not just fail to deliver 
a Pareto improvement, but also produce a social welfare loss.30 These re-
sults provide foundational economic support for earlier work from one of 
us defending the efficiency of a contract law system of default rules that 
only has a few transcontextual defaults.31 
The common law creation mechanism for default rules must satisfy 
stringent conditions to be justified under the GET framework. First, the 
rule must solve a contracting problem that parties in widely disparate 
contexts face. (That is, in GET terms, the rule must add many contingent 
trades.) Second, the rule must be in the set of maximizing solutions to the 
parties’ problem, which is to say that parties in disparate contexts could 
have solved the problem as the court did. Third, the rule must be con-
sistent with the transaction the parties are conducting; otherwise, later 
parties will reject it. Fourth, contracting out of the rule must be costless. 
This property is required because the common law mechanism rests on 
the premise that private agents accept a rule when they do not contract 
away from it (i.e., accept the added contingent allocations as value max-
imizing). As contracting-out costs increase, this premise becomes less 
plausible. Finally, the rule must condition on public information.32  
As a positive matter, the difficulty of satisfying these conditions ex-
plains why only a few transcontextual default rules have emerged from 
common law adjudication in the past two centuries. As a normative mat-
ter, the stringency of these conditions is consistent with the warning les-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 30. See Hart, supra note 25; Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 10. 
 31. The next few paragraphs reprise arguments in Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. 
 32. For example, in the trade of goods, this condition requires that the traded goods be 
roughly homogenous. Then, whether a particular tender conforms to the contract would be pub-
lic information in the agents’ industry. See id. 
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son of GET that market completion strategies are difficult to realize. This 
lesson further suggests that a formalist approach, which limits courts’ dis-
cretion in adjudication, is desirable to add stringency to the common law 
creation mechanism.33  
In discrete areas, however, the rule-creation mechanism may require 
less stringent conditions. There are two reasons for this. First, completing 
local markets is a less demanding partial-equilibrium effort. Second, in 
these areas, the law often supplies expert courts and experts are better 
informed than generalist courts about efficient contingent trades. Two 
examples of such discrete areas are bankruptcy and corporate law. In 
both these areas, an expert decision maker decides cases (the bankruptcy 
court or the Delaware Chancery). Expertise adds value-relevant 
knowledge34 (which matters under the first three conditions of the rule-
creation mechanism) and partly relaxes the constraint that a common law 
rule must condition on public information. This is because what is public 
includes what the decision maker knows. There is also, however, an addi-
tional constraint: the courts’ rules must be consistent linguistically with 
(or at least not contradict) the relevant statute (the Bankruptcy Code or 
the Corporate Code). How this additional constraint and the decision 
maker’s expertise tradeoff in the rule creation process is not known. Fur-
ther, even in these discrete environments, there is always the question of 
whether the decision maker can exactly predict the welfare effects of new 
defaults.35 
Another planning tool is the sticky default. A decision maker—a 
court or a legislature—creates a sticky default when she enacts a rule that 
is costly for agents to avoid. A sticky default can have two rationales: (i) 
the decision maker chooses a solution that is in the set of efficient solu-
tions to a contracting problem that agents face but is concerned that par-
ties will not recognize the solution’s efficiency; or (ii) the decision maker 
is pursuing a policy independent of individual welfare maximization. 
The default is sticky, under the first rationale, because the decision 
maker mistrusts the relevant agents’ ability to make maximizing choices. 
In particular, agents may mistakenly contract out of a default that is too 
easy to avoid. When the analysis is restricted to commercial contexts, 
however, this rationale is largely irrelevant. The second rationale raises 
the question of whether the state can effectively implement policies that 
agents would not choose in markets in which agents are informed, ration-
al and sophisticated. This returns us to the issue of collectively irrational 
equilibrium contracts and pecuniary externalities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 33. As we shall see below, this conclusion is consistent with the insights arising from 
mechanism design theory, under which a formalist approach promotes parties’ dynamic optimi-
zation by minimizing the room for ex post judicial modification of the contract’s optimization 
plan. See infra Section II.C.2.a. 
 34. See Bratton & Sepe, supra note 3, for a discussion of Delaware judicial decision-
making in a GET framework.  
 35. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. 
Economic Challenges for the Law of Contract 
689 
Using sticky defaults to mitigate pecuniary externalities, however, 
might have unwanted effects. If the state enacts a sticky default but per-
mits parties to control the price term or other terms, parties can undo the 
effect of the default. Sticky defaults thus may not stick but instead raise 
contracting costs, and the “avoidance contract” may be even less efficient 
than the original contract. More generally, it is difficult to predict wheth-
er any given rule is better than any other for any particular set of con-
tracting parties. When opting out of the rule is costless, this is irrelevant, 
because parties can contract out. When contracting out is costly, however, 
the market completion strategy may produce an inefficiency that exceeds 
the inefficiency it is supposed to remedy.36 To summarize, the state 
should enact a mandatory rule when the conditions for one are satisfied 
but otherwise should reduce rather than increase contracting costs. Sticky 
defaults are a bad idea. 
3. Standards 
Common law standards are a subset of mandatory rules: the duties 
of good faith (“gf”), fair dealing, and reasonableness cannot be dis-
claimed. Parties, however, can define the content of these standards. In a 
GET framework, this makes standards a market-completion strategy and 
thus functionally makes them closer to default rules than to mandatory 
rules. 
How this creation mechanism functions is aptly illustrated by a dis-
cussion of gf. The common problem the gf rule addresses is the inability 
of parties to anticipate every form of strategic behavior.37 Despite the 
rule’s mandatory phrasing, the gf solution, if done right, satisfies the first 
three characteristics of efficient common law default rules (transcontex-
tuality, acceptability constraint, and contextual consistency), and satisfies 
much of the fifth (public information). The gf solution is to ask whether 
the parties would have banned or modified the challenged behavior if 
they had anticipated it at the contracting stage. If a court gets the correct 
answer, the gf application is consistent with the parties’ deal and is max-
imizing for them. Finally, gf and the requirement of fair dealing both 
condition on publicly observable behavior: the contract and what is re-
garded as (un)acceptable in the trade. 
Regarding differences from common law default rules, gf does not 
satisfy the fourth characteristic (costless opt out). Similar to sticky de-
faults, parties cannot disclaim the duty but can avoid its force by specify-
ing prohibited behavior in the contract or specifying the factors that, if 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 36. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 847, 850 (2000). 
 37. A party seldom would be disadvantaged by strategic behavior if she could costlessly 
reallocate her investment in the deal to other uses. Hence, gf applies when parties move sequen-
tially, the first party makes a (partially or fully) sunk cost investment and the second party makes 
extra-contractual demands. 
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satisfied, would lead courts to find prohibited behavior.38 Either response 
increases marginal contracting costs39: the costs above just writing “the 
duty of gf does not apply to this contract.”40 
 Gf also functions much as do common law defaults. The court com-
pletes the contract with a rule it develops ex post. And the rule is a prec-
edent when later parties do not attempt to treat the strategic behavior 
that led to the introduction of the rule with costly contractual definitions 
of good faith or long recitations of context in the whereas clauses. But 
because gf is costly to avoid, later parties’ silence regarding gf supports a 
weaker inference (compared to accepting a common law default) that the 
result gf would direct a court to reach is in the set of maximizing solutions 
(i.e., increases the level of market completeness).41  
Finally, in GET terms, standards raise two risks. First, standards are 
overproduced, which is contrary to GET’s warning about the difficulty of 
effectively completing markets. Second, and relatedly, standards are less 
likely to add efficient contingent trades. Similar to sticky defaults, stand-
ards create the risk of inefficient contracts. This conclusion advises 
against relying on standards to pursue broader market-completion pro-
jects. 
II. Mechanism Design and Institutional Constraints 
A. A Division of Labor 
In Part I, we explained how moving from the theoretical construc-
tion of complete markets to the reality of incomplete markets reframes 
the law of contracts as a planning device with decentralized implementa-
tion. This recharacterization has both positive and normative implications 
for contract law’s rules and standards. But when price coordination is 
taken out of the picture, the problem becomes how to implement effi-
cient contracts and what constraints hamper efficient implementation. 
The economic tool that illuminates these questions is mechanism de-
sign (MD) theory, the economic field which studies mechanisms alterna-
tive to complete markets to implement an optimal social choice func-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 38. See U.C.C. § 2-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (gf is nondis-
claimable but the contract can define the factors that would constitute a violation). 
 39. This cost is virtually infinite if one considers that the gf obligation imposes a set of 
unspecified behaviors and opting out requires parties to explicitly describe the behaviors they 
want the contract to allow. 
 40. Also, sometimes private information is relevant to a gf application. For example, a 
court may be unable to award damages for a violation without finding the gain that the violation 
precluded, which might very well be private information of the parties.  
 41. Parties also cannot disclaim the duties of fair dealing or behaving reasonably, but 
they can specify factors in the contract that would lead a court to define these duties as the par-
ties prefer. Contractual specifications are marginally more costly than simple disclaimers, how-
ever. 
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tion.42 Contract theory and mechanism design are often used as syno-
nyms. This, however, is an oversimplification. As one commentator ob-
served, “In contract theory, we study the optimal design of incentives for 
a single agent. In mechanism design, we study the optimal design of in-
centives for a group of agents. . . . Contract theory therefore, unlike the 
theory of mechanism design, does not have to deal with strategic interac-
tion.”43 Contract theory deals with principal-agent problems, where the 
principal sets the contract but does not interact with the agent (unless the 
game is repeated). This framework has provided fundamental insights 
about how parties should write principal-agent contracts. However, when 
the goal is understanding how to design contract law institutions (i.e., in-
cluding the interaction with the court system), necessarily more than one 
agent is involved. Hence, the analyst and the parties cannot abstract away 
from the possibility of strategic interactions and, hence, the use of MD 
theory.  
More specifically, there are three reasons that an understanding of 
contract law institutions requires the use of MD theory. First, when par-
ties are sophisticated, both of them participate in the contract design, 
which is inconsistent with contract theory’s principal-agent assumptions. 
Second, in the long-term contracts that tend to characterize commercial 
relationships today, both parties take actions during the course of the 
contractual relationship and, typically, these actions are sequential. 
Therefore, incentives matter for both parties rather than a single agent, 
and strategic interactions are always a possibility.44 Third, courts, as a 
constitutive element of the institutions of contract law, may also induce 
strategic interactions by the parties in expectation.  
The involvement of courts implies that there is a division of labor be-
tween what contract theory and contract law can do in a broader MD 
perspective. L&E scholars, however, have paid little attention to mecha-
nism design theory. This is unfortunate because these scholars are 
uniquely qualified to identify the practical constraints that attend optimal 
theoretical mechanisms. Economists are largely indifferent to these con-
straints because they consider mechanism design a reverse game theory 
exercise that can be carried out from scratch. In part, this is due to a lack 
of knowledge of systematic connections between relevant institutions, as 
well as of legal theories and doctrines. We do not intend to reduce the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 42. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 1153 (1988).  
 43. TILMAN BÖRGERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF MECHANISM DESIGN 
2 (2015). 
 44. As an example, if the seller moves first by altering a generic product so that it is 
valuable to the buyer but worth little elsewhere, the buyer may attempt to renegotiate the price. 
In such a renegotiation, the seller’s costs are sunk and so she would not be reimbursed for them. 
But anticipating this behavior, the seller would not agree initially to alter the generic product. 
Strategic behavior thus precludes an efficient transaction. MD constructs schemes that attempt 
to solve this problem. 
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role of L&E scholars to applications only, with law just a data point, 
however. Optimal contractual mechanisms are the product of the interac-
tion of (i) how parties write incentives, (ii) the law of contracts, and (iii) 
court adjudication. Hence, the contribution of L&E scholars is essential 
to fully understand which optimal contractual mechanisms are possible in 
an advanced economy with incomplete markets. 
B. Optimal Mechanisms 
A mechanism has two components: (i) a communication device, 
which allows agents to aggregate their private information (in contract 
theory, parties exchange “messages” with each other and with the court), 
and (ii) a decision rule, which allows agents to map aggregated infor-
mation into a decision (where formal decision authority belongs either to 
the parties or to the court). Optimal mechanisms induce agents to report 
their private information truthfully45 so that they can implement a deci-
sion rule which replicates the allocation that would obtain in a complete 
market.  
Contract theory and mechanism design theory have deployed mech-
anisms that attempt to solve four problems: 
i. No trade even when trade would be efficient (i.e., Myerson-
Satterthwaite theorem);46 
ii. Adverse selection (i.e., cross-subsidization and market 
breakdown);47 
iii. Inefficient effort when agents cannot observe each other’s 
actions (i.e., moral hazard);48 and 
iv. Inefficient effort when agents can observe each other’s ac-
tions but cannot verify their information to the court (i.e., 
moral hazard or hold-up).49 
In this Part, we provide a brief overview of these problems and the 
mechanisms that respond to them. In Section II.C, we analyze relevant 
institutional constraints. 
1. The No Trading Problem 
The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem50 states that when the buyer’s 
valuation 𝑣 and the seller’s cost 𝑐	are continuously distributed over some 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 45. The informational revelation mechanism can be both direct, as in mechanisms un-
der Laffont’s revelation principle, or indirect, as in mechanisms under Rochet’s taxation princi-
ple. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES 48-51 
(2002); Jean-Charles Rochet, The Taxation Principle and Multi-Time Hamilton-Jacobi Equa-
tions, 14 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 113 (1985).  
 46. Myerson & Satterthwaite, supra note 13.  
 47. See Akerlof, supra note 14.  
 48. See Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, supra note 2. 
 49. See Hart, supra note 25. 
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intervals and are private information,51 then no incentive-compatible rule 
can satisfy both parties’ interim participation constraint for all types.52 In 
English, this means that a seller may demand a price that exceeds the 
buyer’s willingness to pay or the buyer may make a bid that is below the 
seller’s willingness to sell. As a result, the parties may not trade even 
though trade would be efficient (i.e., buyer value exceeds seller cost). 
This problem could be solved if the seller, somehow, could be assured a 
price high enough to equal her cost of selling and the buyer could be as-
sured a price low enough to assure him of a positive gain. In practice, 
both conditions seldom can be met simultaneously, with the result that 
agents fail to trade in many cases where trade would be efficient.53   
An example is useful here. Consider the case of a seller offering a 
widget whose cost is 0. Potential buyers’ valuations of the widget are uni-
formly distributed between 0 and 1. Efficiency would require the seller to 
offer the widget at 0, and no matter what type of buyer the seller encoun-
ters, there will always be an efficient trade. If the seller were to offer the 
widget at 0, the social surplus would be 1/2.54 However, the price that 
maximizes the seller’s expected gain from trade is not 0 but 1/2,55 which 
reduces the expected social surplus to 3/8.56 Note that buyers with valua-
tions between 0 and 1/2 will reject the seller’s offer of 1/2, even though 
trade with such buyers would be efficient. The Myerson-Satterthwaite 
theorem stands in stark contrast with the Coase theorem: sometimes in-
formation problems are so pervasive that parties do leave money on the 
table.  
Economists have developed mechanisms that yield efficient trades 
by subsidizing potential bargains.57 However, the requirement of a be-
                                                                                                             
 50. Myerson & Satterthwaite, supra note 13.  
 51. For example, assume that buyer’s evaluation is continuously distributed over 
[v1,v2] and seller’s evaluation over [c1,c2] such that c1≤v1<c2≤v2. Whether trade is efficient 
thus depends on the realizations of v and c. 
 52. Importantly, this result may obtain both when the parties do not know the value of 
their exchange and when they do know their valuations. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 
13.  
 53. That is, because of information asymmetry, eliciting the agents’ private information 
requires leaving them an “information rent.” To require both parties to receive a rent an outsid-
er must subsidize their trade. Outsiders do not exist, however. 
 54. The social surplus generated is the sum of the seller’s expected surplus, which is 0, 
and the buyer’s expected surplus which is: 
∫ 𝑣	𝑑𝑣*+ = 1/2. 
 55. The seller’s problem consists in determining the offer price, p, which maximizes her 
expected utility, that is max(1 − 𝑝)𝑝, where the first term in parentheses is the probability of 
trading with a buyer. The solution is at 𝑝 = 1/2.  
 56. At 𝑝 = 1/2, the seller’s expected utility is 1/4 and the buyer’s utility surplus is: 
∫ (𝑣 − 1/2)	𝑑𝑣**/6 = 1/8. 
 57. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 13.  
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nevolent third-party subsidizer, if implementable at all,58 seems to locate 
this solution outside contract law.  
Contract law can offer little help when asymmetric information pre-
vents parties from making contracts. Nevertheless, one possibility for fu-
ture investigation is to enrich the contracting space by allowing the seller 
and the buyer to choose how to protect their entitlements. 
i. The buyer is protected by a strong entitlement (specific per-
formance). The seller offers a widget to the buyer at a price 
𝑝*; the buyer anticipates possibly re-trading the widget to a 
third party at 𝑝6 > 𝑝*. 
ii. The buyer is protected by a weak entitlement (expectation 
damages). The seller offers the widget to the buyer at 𝑝*, 
while anticipating the possibility of an alternative trade with 
a third party at 𝑝6 > 𝑝*	(after she has contracted with the 
buyer). 
Whether a weak or a strong entitlement would increase the probabil-
ity of efficient trade depends on the information structure. If the seller 
were to have private information about the third party, she would offer 
the buyer a contract with a lower priced widget and expectation damages, 
i.e., a weak entitlement. The seller would accede to a lower price because 
she would retain the option of trading with the third party. On the other 
hand, if the buyer were to have private information about future trading 
opportunities, the seller would offer the widget under a strong entitle-
ment: the price would be higher but the buyer would have a right to spe-
cific performance. In either case, the parties could use the contract to in-
crease the likelihood of efficient trade.59 
This simple example illustrates how institutional details matter in 
mechanism design analysis. The example also importantly suggests that 
the contracting parties should be allowed to choose the remedy. The 
remedy vindicates the entitlement, and the optimal entitlement depends 
on the information structure, which is private information. In contrast, 
when the court chooses the remedy ex post, it undermines the viability of 
the parties’ mechanism. 
2. Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and All Their Friends 
a. Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection arises when the principal lacks knowledge of her 
agent’s specific characteristics (i.e., she cannot uncover the agent’s 
“type”). In mild adverse selection cases, this leads to cross-subsidization; 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 58. Again, the issue here would be asymmetric information because it is not clear how a 
third party subsidizer would know how much is required. See id. 
 59. The suggestion that entitlement assignments can mitigate the Meyerson and Sat-
terthwaite problem is in Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 13.  
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in more extreme cases, it leads to market breakdown.60 The solutions to 
adverse selection concerns are found in contract theory. These solutions 
include “screening,” when the principal initially offers a contract that in-
duces the agent to reveal her type,61 and “signaling,” when the agent ini-
tially offers a contract that reveals her type.62 In complex environments, 
either party can be the first to offer a contract so that screening and sig-
naling can be considered together. 
The basic mechanism that underlies both screening and signaling so-
lutions is to specify a contract menu (e.g., a set of pairs of price and quan-
tity or quality) that appeals to different agent types, so that the types are 
induced to sort themselves out by the contracts they choose. The ques-
tion, then, is whether contract law can play a role in implementing this 
mechanism. We consider two contexts. In the first the adverse selection 
problem presents when the parties contract. This context generalizes the 
Myerson-Satterthwaite problem. As we saw above, the state could permit 
parties to add the trading of legal entitlements to menus of prices and 
quantities or qualities. But because courts lack the information to create 
menus, their role is necessarily limited to enforcing the contract menus, 
including entitlements, the parties generate.63  
The second context is dynamic, when adverse selection arises during 
the contractual relationship, and raises a more pervasive problem. For 
example, suppose that parties design a mechanism that reveals the seller’s 
type. The buyer could use this knowledge to renegotiate the contract in 
his favor. This creates a “ratchet” effect,64 which undermines the sorting 
mechanism by inducing the parties not to reveal private information at 
all. In order to eliminate the ratchet effect, parties thus require a com-
mitment not to renegotiate.65 As shown above, this commitment is hard 
to enforce. 
Dynamic adverse selection problems illustrate why the possibility of 
renegotiation-proof mechanisms is an important topic in MD theory. 
These mechanisms are possible because parties can include the results of 
a future renegotiation in the initial contract.66 For example, consider a 
seller who has to sort buyers with high valuations and low valuations for a 
widget. In a dynamic context, the seller can give the buyer the option to 
receive widgets at different points in time in accordance with a decreasing 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 60. See Akerlof, supra note 14; Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in 
Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
 61. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). 
 62. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
 63. For an example, see Alan Schwartz, Price Discrimination with Contract Terms: The 
Lost Volume Problem, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 294 (2010). 
 64. See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 42, at 1155. 
 65. See Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics, 55 
REV. ECON. STUD. 509, 509-10 (1988).  
 66. See Bolton, supra note 22, at 303-304.  
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price schedule, or to receive all the widgets at the end at a flat price. Be-
cause high valuation buyers lose more by postponing consumption, they 
will choose the first option. Hence, this bargaining protocol implements a 
sorting mechanism: the agents will identify themselves by their contract 
choice. That renegotiation-proof mechanisms are possible, however, does 
not mean they are easy to implement. Details matter here. For example, 
in complex transactional environments, parties tend to exchange non-
homogenous goods over time. This implies that the parties’ valuations 
might change as new information materializes during the course of their 
relationship. Failure to consider this dynamic constraint might undermine 
the renegotiation-proof mechanism. 
As we shall see next, renegotiation-proofness also plays a key role in 
the design of mechanisms addressing moral hazard. Nevertheless, the 
economic literature has paid little attention to the practical constraints—
including institutional constraints—that may affect renegotiation-proof 
mechanisms. We discuss some of these constraints in detail in Section 
II.C.1. 
b. Moral Hazard Without Observability 
Moral hazard (in its classic formulation) is the other principal-agent 
problem; it arises when the principal cannot observe the agent’s actions 
after the parties conclude a contract. As with adverse selection, moral 
hazard presents a contract theory problem that only the parties can solve. 
Contract law, however, can enforce parties’ incentive schemes. While this 
may seem obvious, those incentives may involve penalties or broad non-
compete clauses. Current contract law thus is itself an institutional con-
straint, limiting the parties’ ability to solve moral hazard problems. 
In response, the state could facilitate the parties’ ability to create re-
negotiation-proof mechanisms. One solution is to raise renegotiation 
costs by enforcing party-created restrictions on renegotiation, such as 
banning oral agreements. Another possible solution would be to add a 
third party.67 Can courts play this role? Alternatively, can the contracting 
parties create a third-party decision maker who will serve that role? 
We begin exploring these questions below, but our main contribu-
tion here is methodological. We suggest that these are the questions the 
L&E literature should address. 
c. Moral Hazard with Observability and Non-Verifiability 
When contracts are incomplete, moral hazard may arise if parties 
cannot verify payoff-relevant information to the court. As in the example 
above, let a contract require a party to make a specific investment up-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 67. See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 20, at 24-25.  
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front. If that party anticipates ex post moral hazard—the other party will 
change the deal—and the party cannot verify her loss to a court, she will 
reduce her investment. There are a number of solutions to this problem 
in the economic literature but few are observed in practice.68  
Ex post moral hazard with unverifiability is perhaps the key incom-
plete contract problem. L&E scholars have studied the problem, but have 
slighted the MD literature that addresses how symmetrically informed 
parties can efficiently communicate to a third party such as a court. Eric 
Maskin showed that it is possible to design a mechanism that induces the 
parties truthfully and publicly to verify the observed state of the world by 
fining them if they disagree on what the realized state is.69 John Moore 
and Rafael Repullo also showed that when some dynamic is introduced in 
the game, revelation is truthful and implementation is unique (unlike in 
Maskin), as long as fines can be imposed on the parties.70 A more radical 
criticism of the incomplete contract literature has come from Eric Maskin 
and Jean Tirole’s “irrelevance theorem.”71 The theorem establishes that 
the parties’ inability to specify future states of the world is irrelevant as 
long as they can specify a plan of action contingent on (future) payoffs, 
which can be truthfully announced in a revelation game as in Moore & 
Repullo. Under these results, the research question no longer is whether 
there are solutions to the unverifiability problem but, rather, whether 
those solutions are practically implementable, a question we take up next. 
C. Practicable Implementation 
1. Renegotiation 
Renegotiation-proofness is a requirement shared by several mecha-
nisms that are designed to solve information problems. The study of these 
mechanisms teaches that parties might need to commit to ex post ineffi-
cient outcomes in order to preserve ex ante efficiency. The practical im-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 68. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, Renegotiation De-
sign with Unverifiable Information, 62 ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994); see also Malani & Holden, 
supra note 18 (suggesting that the Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey mechanism has actually been im-
plemented in some instances and is, anyway, feasible in practice). 
 69. Eric Maskin, Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 23 
(1999) (paper first presented at the summer workshop of the Econometric Society in Paris, June 
1977).  
 70. John Moore & Rafael Repullo, Subgame Perfect Implementation, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 1191 (1988). More specifically, the central result of Moore & Repullo is the 
following: if preferences are quasi-linear, any single-valued Social Choice Rule f can be strongly 
subgame-perfect implemented using a sequential mechanism in which the sum of transfers 
equals any desired amount along the equilibrium path. This subgame-perfect implementation 
works well when agents have sufficiently conflicting interests (as in the case of quasi-linear utili-
ties, where each agent benefits from a bigger transfer from another agent).  
 71. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999). 
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plementation question is how contract law might facilitate this commit-
ment.72 
Some contract law scholars have hypothesized that an instrumental 
use of contract law doctrines can help reduce the space of renegotiation 
and, therefore, improve efficiency.73 Legal doctrines, however, cannot 
prevent parties from renegotiating. A more interesting question is wheth-
er parties can restrict renegotiation in the contract. This question has 
been raised by some prominent law and economic scholars,74 who have 
defended the efficiency of anti-modification clauses against the courts’ 
reluctance to enforce them.75 
In general, however, contract law is unfriendly to MD solutions to 
the renegotiation problem. The Restatement seems to permit any modifi-
cation that is “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated 
by the parties when the contract was made.”76 Also, the bargaining proto-
col in some solutions requires giving one party the ability to make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the other.77 The doctrine of economic duress may 
constrain these protocols by making take-it-or-leave-it offers unenforcea-
ble.78 The common law pre-existing duty doctrine makes some modifica-
tion promises unenforceable because they lack consideration, but this 
constraint is easily overcome if the parties rescind the original contract. 
Finally, the law bans anti-modification clauses though there is no exter-
nality.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 72. It is worth observing here that while sometimes parties in long-term contracts might 
seem to adopt renegotiation mechanisms, these are mere price mechanisms designed to ensure 
that the contract’s continuation value stays above its defection value. For example, these mecha-
nisms link the contract price to indices or they include a price bargaining clause or an arbitration 
clause. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete 
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 271 (1992). Economically, these mecha-
nisms ensure that the parties’ participation constraint is locally binding but other than that they 
do not to address information problems. 
 73. For example, Steven Shavell suggests that courts could void renegotiation on 
grounds of duress or unconscionability. Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages 
for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 TEX. L. REV. 831 (2006). Instead, Robert 
Hillman proposes to subject the modification of the initial agreement to a substantive test of 
fairness or good faith. Under this test, a modification made in response to new circumstances, 
unanticipated at the time of contracting, would generally be enforced, while an attempt to re-
write the original terms would not. Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modification Under 
the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979). 
 74. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective 
on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997); Schwartz & Watson, supra note 20, at 
24. 
 75. See, e.g., David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public 
and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 607, 
638-49. The rejection of anti-modification clauses rests on the view that “the parties’ latest ex-
pression of intent is preferred to earlier expressions because courts should implement what par-
ties want, not what they once wanted, and also because later intentions are likely to be better 
informed than earlier ones.” Schwartz & Watson, supra note 20, at 4. 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 77. See Aghion, Dewatripont & Rey, supra note 68.  
 78. For a practical solution to this constraint, see Malani & Holden, supra note 18, at 
172-76. 
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Drawing on MD, a solution to overcome the unenforceability of an-
ti-modification clauses could be to add a third party who has an interest 
independent from the parties’ interests and who could serve as a com-
mitment device.79 In some settings, we already observe similar solutions. 
For example, managerial golden parachutes commit firms not to change 
the status quo by transferring control to a third party (i.e., the bidder). 
Another example of a commitment device in the corporate context is the 
requirement of a supermajority to amend the corporate charter. A similar 
case is that of a debt indenture requiring a qualifying majority, or even 
unanimity, to modify the debt contract. Still another case is to make an 
irreversible investment that serves as a credible commitment to some ex 
post action.80 In all of these cases, however, the commitment problem 
finds a solution in either the institutional complexity of the contracting 
parties (e.g., corporations) or the multi-party nature of the transaction. 
But as we have seen, solutions are lacking in the common pure bilat-
eral context. Here the question is how symmetrically informed parties can 
communicate to courts or otherwise involve them in solutions. The par-
ties could, for example, instruct the court to allow renegotiation only up-
on extreme circumstances (i.e., an event verifiable by the court). Indeed, 
when an ex post loss is a rare possibility and yet likely to be large, ex post 
renegotiation might be desirable in spite of its negative effect on ex ante 
incentives. After all, if the parties are not able to predict the event at 
signing, renegotiation should have little, if any, impact on incentives. So 
framed, the problem becomes whether parties can efficiently communi-
cate to courts the tradeoff on these two margins. 
Arbitrators might be better than courts at evaluating the parties’ in-
formation.81 First, specialist arbitrators are better than generalist courts at 
evaluating ex post states, suggesting that arbitrators can better optimize 
between ex ante and ex post efficiency. Second, arbitrators are more like-
ly to obey the parties’ interpretative instructions than courts. And there is 
evidence that parties who use arbitration routinely give interpretative in-
structions.82  
This raises the question of how a third party could enforce a no-
renegotiation contract when the parties ex post agree to renegotiate any-
way. One solution could be to delegate the appointment of specialized 
arbitrators from trade associations, which might exploit reputational 
mechanisms for enforcing the no-renegotiation term. An additional solu-
tion could be for parties themselves to create a contractual structure 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 79. See Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the 
Law and Economics of Contract Modification, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 487 (2006). 
 80. For example, Dewatripont considered the case of an incumbent firm who, facing a 
potential entry, signs labor contracts as a commitment to excessive post-entry output. See Ma-
thias Dewatripont, Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal 
Labor Contracts, 104 Q.J. ECON. 589, 596-97 (1989).  
 81. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1.  
 82. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 16, at 1781-82.  
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which would vest in third parties the legal or reputational power to en-
force the no-renegotiation contract.83 
Finally, there is court renegotiation. MD studies of renegotiation-
proof contracts, regardless of the specific information problem they con-
sider, describe renegotiation as a contractual choice. Renegotiation thus 
can implement an ex post Pareto improvement (though this would come 
at the expense of ex ante efficiency). Renegotiation, however, also can be 
court-mandated, in the sense that courts that interpret the contract can 
modify the original contract. For example, good faith and the use of a 
broad evidentiary base might give the court authority to redistribute con-
tractual entitlements differently than in their original specification. We 
call this “court renegotiation.” Unlike parties’ renegotiation, court rene-
gotiation responds to a criterion of global (i.e., Kaldor-Hicks) efficiency. 
Economically, however, party renegotiation and court renegotiation both 
jeopardize the effectiveness of the contract’s incentive scheme. 
2. Enforcement and Interpretation 
Contractual enforcement actually is an exercise in interpretation—
what is the deal?—rather than an exercise in remedy choice.84 To be sure, 
there is a set of remedies that a promisee can invoke for breach. But to 
enforce a contract is to give the promisee the performance that she 
bought. To do this is to enforce the contract specifically, which requires 
the court to interpret it. The conjunction between enforcement and inter-
pretation also runs in the other direction: courts’ interpretative practices 
affect the parties’ contracting behavior, because the costs of writing a 
contract include the expected costs of enforcing it.85 
MD theory can contribute to the study of this conjunction in two 
ways. First, MD theory predicts that a formalist approach to courts’ in-
terpretative practices is more likely to promote efficient allocations. Sec-
ond, the theory suggests mechanisms that can facilitate more efficient 
communication between parties and courts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 83. Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting: A Preliminary Study 
(2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
 84. Consider, for example, the use of an expectation interest remedy, which is the sum 
that would put the promisee in the same position she would have occupied had the promisor per-
formed. If the parties’ contract required a promisor/seller either to transfer specified goods or to 
transfer a sum that equals the value the goods would have had for the buyer, then either transfer 
would be performance. A court that orders the promisor to pay the sum thus is enforcing the 
parties’ contract specifically. On the other hand, if the contract required the seller just to transfer 
the goods, then performance would be a transfer. A court that orders the seller to pay money is 
said to be awarding damages while a court that orders the seller to transfer goods is said to be 
awarding specific performance. But, properly understood, the court is awarding specific perfor-
mance in both cases. 
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a. Formalism 
Formalism, in the Willistonian sense, defines an approach to con-
tract interpretation where the evidentiary base for making interpretations 
is largely comprised of the written words. To the contrary, contextualism 
defines an approach where the evidentiary base reaches well beyond the 
contract’s written words.  
MD theory implies that formalism is the preferable interpretative 
practice, for three reasons. First, formalism reduces the likelihood of 
court renegotiation because it ties the court more closely to the original 
contract. Hence, formalism functions as a commitment device to avoid 
modifications. Importantly, the utility of this function does not turn on 
whether ex post court renegotiation is efficient.  
Even when the court’s exercise of its discretionary authority, ena-
bled by legal standards or contextualist practices, selects “the best action, 
given the current situation,” this “will not typically result in the social ob-
jective function being maximized.”86 In a dynamic setting, “current deci-
sions of economic agents depend in part upon their expectations of future 
policy actions.”87 Therefore, the anticipation of changes in the court’s ac-
tions will have an immediate effect on agents’ current decisions, jeopard-
izing their ability to implement efficient plans. That is, because contextu-
alism facilitates court renegotiation, it introduces a time-inconsistency 
problem into contracting that can prevent parties from optimizing their 
plans. This suggests that the ex ante distortions that arise from contextu-
alism are serious. 
Second, under a contextualist (i.e., renegotiation-inclined) interpre-
tative regime, parties might use simple contracts because they present 
fewer interpretative issues and so reduce the likelihood of court renegoti-
ation.88 The use of simple contracts, however, may reduce the parties’ 
ability to implement the sophisticated bargaining protocols that MD the-
ory supports. 
Third, economic theory predicts that formalism might provide the 
contracting parties with better incentives, to the extent that it functions as 
an imperfect monitoring system (i.e., that directs courts to employ a more 
restricted evidentiary base) relative to contextualism (i.e., that directs 
courts to employ a larger evidentiary base).89 A monitoring system that is 
based only on observable outputs, and does not attempt to extract all 
available information, might better incentivize agents to perform by func-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 86. Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Incon-
sistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 474 (1977).  
 87. Id. 
 88. Schwartz & Watson, supra note 20, at 6.  
 89. Cf. Jacques Crémer, Arm’s Length Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON. 275 (1995) (ana-
lyzing the incentive properties of imperfect monitoring systems relative to monitoring systems 
that are designed to extract all available information). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:678 2021 
702 
tioning as a “hard budget constraint.”90 This means that suboptimal out-
comes under the contract trigger punishment and so, in expectation, in-
centivize performance.91 Conversely, when the agent anticipates a “soft 
budget constraint,” under which suboptimal outcomes might be excused, 
their incentives to perform are lessened. Restated, under some condi-
tions, the incentive effect dominates the superior-information effect in 
promoting efficient allocations. As applied to court interpretation, this 
suggests that a contextualist approach that better informs courts would 
come at the expense of weakening the parties’ ex ante incentives to per-
form.  
At this point, however, the question arises of how one reconciles the 
normative implications of GET with those of MD. As we saw in Section 
I.B.2, GET’s lesson about the difficulty of completing markets provides 
normative support for the common law production of default rules. To 
the extent formalism can be regarded as limiting the room for court dis-
cretion in adjudication and then adding further stringency to the rule cre-
ation mechanism, MD and GET point in the same normative direction. 
Yet, the production of optimal defaults requires courts to adjudicate 
many cases (i.e., to try a decision rule r several times in cases for r to 
harden into the default R). To this extent, GET supports more (or even 
systematic) court intervention, while MD establishes that court interven-
tion should be minimal to facilitate parties’ dynamic optimization strate-
gy. How does one reconcile this apparent inconsistency between the two 
theoretical requirements?92 
There are two answers. First, the common law production process of 
defaults is finite; there are few common law rules, which reduces the 
scope of this inconsistency. Second, and more substantially, the incon-
sistency is solved because there are two distinct issues at play: (i) the pro-
duction of (default) rules and (ii) the consumption of rules. Under this 
distinction, the problem can be reframed: (i) is optimal when it is carried 
out at common law because the common law production mechanism is 
selective and sensitive to the parties’ information;93 however, (i) produces 
an externality on (ii), as court intervention limits parties’ dynamic optimi-
zation. Economically, however, at the equilibrium (i) would never be 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 90. See J. Kornai, Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems, 47 
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necessary (and so no externality would ever arise), if the parties could 
implement the optimal mechanisms we have described in Section II.B of 
this Essay. Only off the equilibrium path, court intervention would be re-
quired.94 
But, then, sophisticated parties would determine how courts should 
behave off the equilibrium path. If parties believed that their mechanism 
was not robust enough to prevent court intervention (for example, be-
cause of legal constraints), they would accept court intervention to pro-
duce rule r and opt for a formalist interpretative approach for the reasons 
discussed above. In other cases, parties could reject court intervention 
and therefore limit the production of r. Eventually, this process would 
slow down the production of common law rules, as courts would have less 
access to relevant parties’ information to turn r into R. Yet we would not 
have zero court intervention, even for sophisticated parties. Viewed 
through this lens, formalism is thus the only interpretive approach that 
optimizes the tradeoff between (i) rule production and (ii) rule consump-
tion. 
b. Parties’ Communication 
Courts can enforce what parties write but can know only what par-
ties tell them. For example, the expectation interest remedy is ex post ef-
ficient because it requires the promisor to choose the least costly path be-
tween breach and damages and performance at a loss. A court cannot 
protect the expectation, however, unless it can compute damages; but 
when these are unverifiable, parties can write a liquidated damage clause.  
Therefore, the question of what symmetrically informed parties can 
tell courts is an interpretation issue. This issue, however, has received vir-
tually no attention by L&E scholars. Relatedly, L&E scholars have also 
largely ignored the economic literature dealing with truth-telling revela-
tion mechanisms.95 Yet the ability of parties to write efficient contracts is 
increasing in their ability to communicate information to the court.  
Consider a procurement example. Suppose there is a set of widgets 
𝑤*, 𝑤6, . . . , 𝑤:. The demand for widgets is heterogenous: some buyers 
need 𝑤6 while other buyers need 𝑤;, and etc. Let a particular contracting 
dyad agree to trade 𝑤<. The court should order the buyer to pay only if 
the seller tendered 𝑤<, and the seller’s incentive to invest efficiently in 
producing 𝑤< is increasing in the probability that she will be paid if she 
does. The court’s task is to recover the parties’ “type”: that is, the widget 
they intended to trade.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 94. Off of the equilibrium path is a familiar state to lawyers. In equilibrium, under a 
negligence rule there are no accidents. We do see them, though. It is an empirical question how 
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Parties can inform the court in three ways: (i) the contract, which can 
contain information about the context (i.e., 𝑤< is necessary for producing 
a particular type of machine, and the contract describes the machine); (ii) 
the performance: the likelihood that the court will find that the parties 
agreed to trade 𝑤< is increasing in the probability that the seller tendered 
𝑤<; and (iii) the trial, at which parties can introduce evidence about their 
type.  
An efficiency-maximizing court will develop interpretative rules that 
create an incentive for parties to choose the cost-minimizing mix of com-
munication channels.96 The above discussion suggests, again, that courts 
might better pursue this end by privileging a formalist approach in con-
tract interpretation. With a formalist court, for example, parties are not 
incentivized to choose excessively simple contracts to avoid the higher 
enforcement costs of more complex contracts. This matters because effec-
tive communication might require more contractual complexity. Like-
wise, formalism reduces the likelihood that untruthful trial communica-
tion (i.e., the parties’ ability to introduce evidence other than the written 
agreement in support of their preferred interpretation) might distort ex 
ante incentives. Further, only under a formalist approach can perfor-
mance be relied upon to provide truthful information. With a formalist 
court, sophisticated parties can anticipate what the court will do with a 
good level of approximation and adjust the contract’s terms accordingly 
(i.e., internalizing the court’s behavior). As a result, the observed perfor-
mance will more likely be a contract equilibrium and, therefore, truth-
telling (i.e., the tender of 𝑤< will reflect that the parties agreed to ex-
change 𝑤<). Conversely, with a contextualist court, the parties are less 
able to predict what the court will do. As a result, the observed perfor-
mance might not implement the contract equilibrium (i.e., the seller 
might tender 𝑤< even if the parties agreed to exchange 𝑤;). 
The state also can support efficient parties’ communication by inter-
vening on two margins: reducing contract-creation costs and reducing tri-
al costs. This recommendation challenges classic contract theory assump-
tions, under which the cost to parties of describing the subject of sale (in 
the example, a type of widget) is assumed either to be costless or infi-
nite.97 Standardization is a possible response to the first margin. For ex-
ample, the state can create standard forms for particular widely used 
terms, such as a standard way to describe a warranty or to disclose an in-
terest rate. A limit of this approach, however, is that standardization 
would have reduced, if any, impact on idiosyncratic contracts.   
A less obvious method—but supported by the results of MD theo-
ry—is to provide specialized courts. We saw above that specialized arbi-
trators may facilitate the implementation of efficient revelation mecha-
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nisms which address issues of renegotiation. The intuition can be general-
ized to parties’ communications. An aspect of a decision maker’s exper-
tise is knowledge of the context in which parties function and what goods 
they usually trade. Thus, when parties anticipate decision-maker exper-
tise, they can write shorter contracts, be more confident that the decision 
maker will infer their intention from what the seller does, and expect 
shorter trials because they can introduce less evidence. Expert decision 
makers, it is thought, are useful because they are more likely to make 
correct decisions. A perhaps more important benefit is ex ante: expert 
decision makers expand the set of efficient contracts parties can write. 
And of course cheaper trials perform the same function. The conclusion 
here, though, is methodological: the question of how the state can facili-
tate communication between parties and courts is understudied. 
More broadly, the relevant policy issue is whether parties can in-
volve courts in their implementation schemes. Economists suggest involv-
ing courts in the message games parties can create, but they do not fully 
consider institutional constraints. Arbitrators and expert courts are a pos-
sible response, though this raises the question of whether parties can 
choose the contract’s decision maker. 
Conclusion 
We introduce general equilibrium theory and mechanism design 
theory in a general sense (rather than in piece meal applications) to the 
law and economics of contracts. 
This introduction reveals three understudied scholarly areas. In the 
first area, the equilibrium contract is individually rational for the parties 
but the market outcome is inefficient. Which mandatory rules, if any, 
could respond to this concern? The second area involves costly infor-
mation and has three facets: (i) can courts complete incomplete contracts 
in information poor environments? (ii) can parties efficiently communi-
cate context and other information to courts to help courts complete or, 
at least interpret, second-best efficient contracts? (iii) can parties involve 
courts in information revelation schemes to better inform parties and so 
increase the set of efficient contracts? The third understudied area in-
volves renegotiation and has three facets: (i) when is renegotiation effi-
cient? (ii) when would renegotiation undo ex ante efficient incentive 
schemes? (iii) what do courts now do to foster renegotiation and what 
could they do to impede it? 
This largely positive Essay has two normative implications. First, 
formalist interpretative practices are more efficient than contextualist in-
terpretative practices. This is because parties are better than courts at 
solving asymmetric information problems and formalism ties courts to the 
ex ante contract, thus implementing (and giving parties incentives to de-
velop) party solutions. Second, because the ex ante negative effects of re-
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negotiation in undoing otherwise efficient incentive schemes dominate 
the ex post benefits, the law of contract modification should be amended 
to allow anti-modification clauses and, more generally, hamper rather 
than facilitate renegotiation. 
Lastly, this Essay points to several directions for future research. 
Perhaps the most urgent is investigating the alternative mechanisms par-
ties are already implementing—either as substitutes or as complements—
to overcome the legal constraints to optimal bargaining protocols. Our 
intuition is that these mechanisms point to a common shortcoming in MD 
models. Indeed, these models assume that contracting parties are reduci-
ble to simple transactional units (e.g., a buyer and a seller), conceived as 
monolithic entities that make unitary decisions. In actuality, complex con-
tracts are contracts between parties with complex organizations (e.g., 
corporations). This changes the space of contracting, as the dimension of 
possible exchanges is not bilateral but multilateral, with several important 
implications. The investigation of these implications should be at the cen-
ter stage of future L&E contracting analysis. 
